We compute the fraction of all the possible 2x2 symmetric nonzerosum games in strategic form with random payoff matrix falls into a certain class defined by Nash equilibrium conditions and Pareto optimality conditions
INTRODUCTION
There is a large amount of investigation on dynamic models based on 2x2 symmetric nonzero-sum games [Levine] , [Vaughan] , where a certain payoff, and some times some uncertainty on it [Matsushima] , is chosen to construct the model. The features of the static games defined by the possible payoff matrices are very important in these dynamic models [Marshall] , but so far we lack a complete cartography of the space of possible payoff matrices to guide our selection for a certain model.
SYMMETRIC 2xGAMES IN THE STRATE-GIC FORM
Among the nonzero sum games, the most simple kind of game is probably the 2x2 symmetric with perfect information. And the most simple way to represent it is the strategic form introduced in [von Neumann 1] .
= ({A, B}, {0, 1}⊗{0, 1}, $ A : {0, 1}⊗{0, 1} → R, $ B : {0, 1}⊗{0, 1} → R) (1) where represents the game, {A, B} is the set of players, {0, 1} is the space of strategies of any of the players, and the composite space {0, 1} ⊗ {0, 1} is the space of positions. $ A and $ B are the payoff function for the two players. This is a function that goes from the space of positions to some ordered set, which is generally Z, the set of the integer numbers. These payoff functions are sometimes referred as payoff matrices, taking the labels of the strategies as indexes
In symmetric games, there is a symmetry condition on the payoffs, which ensures equality of conditions for the two players [Weibull 1 ]. If we interchange players, both the indexes i, j are interchanged, and the payoff matrices P A , P B are interchanged.
ESSENTIAL AND UNESSENTIAL FEATURES IN THE PAYOFF BIMATRIX
An acceptable payoff can be defined in any set with an order relation [Hargreaves 1], but it proves to be very useful to define it within a compact set. If we assign a numerical payoff to both players in every choice situation, we need 8 numbers. The condition of symmetry reduces them to 4. But as it was stated in [Harsanyi] and [Luce] , the properties of the game cannot depend either on the value of payoff represented by number 0 (additive invariance), or an overall factor in the scale of payoffs shared by both players (scale invariance). Then, there are two parameters that can be ruled out, and we are left with only two numbers. Let's represent the payoff matrices for A and B in the following way:
The mean of this numbers is irrelevant (additive invariance), so can substract it from the four parameters (that is a ′ = a − 1 4
(a + b + c + d)) and the properties of the game are preserved. We can also use the scale invariance to take rid of the overall scale considering (a',b',c',d') as a vector in R 4 and normalizing. (a
To make the two relevant parameters explicit, we choose a SO(4) transformation wich takes a ′′ into
wich we know is always zero, and get, for example,these new parameters:
G 0 is allways zero, but G A is the difference between the expected payoffs of each player if the other player chooses 0 y 1 with equal probability. G B is the difference in the other player 's payoffs if each player plays an uniform distribution of probabilities 0 and 1. G AB is the payoff difference between the two symmetric situations (A choosing the same as B)
GEOMETRIC REPRESENTATION
The vector of these G parameters is also unitary, G 0 being allways zero, (G A , G B , G AB ) can only vary in the surface of a 3D sphere. The conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria and Pareto Optimal conditions are sets of unequalities involving these three parameters. These conditions cut the surface of the sphere at planes, so it is posible to view the different kinds of 2x2 non-zero symmetric games as portions of the unit sphere. Every possible game in the considered type, defined by a payoff matrix, has a "normalized" representative in the surface of the sphere (except for the trivial one with the same payoff for any situation). The fraction of surface of the unit sphere enclosed by the planes corresponding to the conditions is exactly the fraction of the possible games set wich fulfills those conditions.
NASH EQUILIBRIA (NE)
The definition for a Nash Equilibrium (NE from now on) is simple: if both player decrease their payoff departing individually from a certain choice condition, then this condition is a NE.[Nash 1] For example, the position(i * ,j * ) is a NE iff:
In a symmetric game, that means that we only compare elements in the same column of the player A payoff matrix, or in the same row of the player B payoff matrix. In terms of our payoff parameters, all these conditions have the form:
Where the indexes i and j can take values within the set of strategies {0, 1}. A remarkable feature of these conditions is that they only involve the parameters G A and G AB . They are completely insensitive to G B , the average difference in payoff owed to a change in the other player strategy.
Symmetric positions
For the symmetric positions (i=j) it is easily seen that both conditions are the same:
This condition will be fulfilled for half the games, for it defines a plane that cuts the sphere in two halves, both for (1 − i)(1 − j) = 1 and ij = 1. The planes are orthogonal, and that allows us to infer that 1 4
of the games will have (0,0) as a Nash equilibrium, of the games will have both positions as Nash equilibria.
Nonsymmetric positions
For the nonsymmetric positions , the two conditions are different (s 1 = 1, s 2 = −s 3 ). The explicit contitions are:
These conditions, again, define two perpendicular planes. In fact, the planes defined are the same as in the conditions for the symmetric positions, but the conditions are fulfilled precisely in the zone excluded by the conditions for (0,0) and (1,1).
1 4 of the possible games will then have two non-symmetric Nash equilibria, and none will have only one.
A plane representation
So far, the conditions do not involve the G B parameter at all, and therefore we can restrict ourselves to the (G A , G AB ) plane to consider NE alone. The NE conditions for 00 and 11 define two orthogonal planes perpendicular to G B = 0. Each divides the sphere in two halves, and the halves so defined overlap in 1 4 of the sphere. The NE conditions for 01 and 10 define the same two planes mentioned above. The region of the sphere they enclose is the quarter of the sphere where there is no symmetric NE. Summing up, the fractions are:
One symmetric NE: 1/2 Two symmetric NE: 1/4 Two nonsymmetric NE: 1/4
PARETO OPTIMA (PO)
A situation is Pareto-optimum (PO from now on) when each player can improve his payoff, but doing so, he diminishes the other player's payoff. [Owen 1] One of the conditions for a certain choice situation to be a PO is clearly that it is not a NE. The other, concerning the other player's payoff maximization, can be viewed as the NE condition on the transposed payoff matrix. Transposing payoff matrix amounts to interchanging G A and G B , so we already have them:
The geometric complete picture
NE conditions generates planes defined by (G A ± G AB = 0), and OP conditions generate planes defined by (G B ± G AB = 0). To achieve some symmetry in our partition of the sphere we need to cut the sphere with the plane (G A ± G B = 0) as well. This involves comparing one diagonal element of the payoff matrix with the other diagonal element, and comparing one nondiagonal element with the other nondiagonal element
Now we divided the sphere with these three pairs of orthogonal planes, getting 24 identical regions, which will allow us to compute easily the fraction of the sphere corresponding to certain set of such NE or PO conditions. Every region of the sphere characterized by NE and OP conditions will be conformed by some of these 24 small curve "triangles", which we will call elementary regions from now on.
We can also use another norm to choose the set of game representatives which is going to give us a clearer picture. If we take the higher absolute value of the elements of the payoff matrix as a norm, we are progecting the space of possible games into the surface of the unit cube.
The Nash and Pareto conditions for this cube will be all the diagonal planes cutting the cube in two equal halves. Then, it becomes apparent that all the areas are equal. In the picture this partition of the cube is shown, together with the unfolded surface as it is going to be presented later. In the central square G AB > 0, while in the square formed by the four extreme triangles of the unfolded cube G AB < 0
A classification of 2x2 nonzero sum symmetric games
We can see the EN conditions affecting G AB and G A and the PO conditions affecting G AB and G B as classification criteria, meaning the following for a certain position:
• If the position is NE it means that each player gets a maximum payoff for himself.
• If the position is PO it means that each player produces a maximum payoff for the other player.
The importance of the first criteria is evident by itself, but the other criteria becomes important in cooperative game [Owen 2] where players are allow to interact before choosing, or in dynamic games, where in some cases players learn that it can be advantageous to behave "generously" [Basar 1] Normally the PO definition include the inverse of the NE condition (the PO payoff must be susceptible to be raised by any player) [Owen 1] . But here we are going to try a less restrictive approach, taking the conditions on the transpose of the payoff matrices as independent from the conditions of the actual payoff matrix.
Using these NE and PO conditions independently we can assign each region of the sphere a certain kind of game . The NE and PO planes cut the sphere into 12 regions, with 3 different sizes. There are 8 triangular (elementary) regions covering each of the sphere, conformed by 4 elementary regions. We should, however, take into account the arbitrariness of the labeling of strategies 0 and 1, and only distinguish diagonal (symmetric) postions where both players play the same strategy and nondiagonal (nonsymmetric) conditions where they don't. Then we would have 9 kinds of games.
It can be wise, however, to discriminate wether a certain diagonal P0 position (pure or mixed) have higher or lower payoff than a certain NE po-sition. This give us 12 kinds of games. This is exactly twice the number obtained by Rappoport and others for classes of 2x2 symmetric games. [Rapoport] , [Robinson] 
ROBINSON ORDER GRAPHS
To organize the results in a simple way, We will use a very powerfull tool presented in [Robinson] . This is a classification scheme for strictly ordered payoffs (where there are no two equal elements in the payoff matrix) where games are classified according to the ordering of the payoff elements. Robinson draws a XY plot of A payoff vs. B payoff, locating the four points corresponding to the four positions.
Then he connects the points with arrows when a player can unilaterally shift from one to other. The arrow points at the point where the payoff is higher for the involved player. If A's payoff is plotted in the Y axis, then A's arrows point allways upwards and B's arrows points allways to the right. Doing so, we get an order graph where NE are points where arrows converge.
To find PO we draw arrows that point in the direction where the other player's payof is increased. We will call these arrows Pareto arrows. The points fulfilling PC are the points where the Pareto arrows converge.Conversely, we will call the arrows ponting in the direction where the own payoff increases Nash arrows. We can represent this game in a simpler way putting a white dot in the Nash Equilibrium (0,0). The position of the NE tells us where the Nash arrows point to, and from them we can infer the direction of Pareto arrows. The Pareto arrows with positive slope will have the same direction as the Nash arrows, but the Pareto arrows with negative slope will go opposite. Then we can infer that the nondiagonal positions are PO.
The simplified graph allows us to distinguish the game above from another similar game, the one having the transpose payof matrix 4 1 5 0 . The simplified graph for this another game is: These games are in two opposed pairs of adjacent elementary triangles in the cube. The fraction is then 1 6 of the total. Games in this class have an essentialy unproblematic solution, for there is only one equilibrium, and it is very stable.
2 The other diagonal position fulfills PC These case also covers 4 triangles on the sphere. The fraction is then 1 6 of the total. Games in this class have an essentialy unproblematic solution.
Here we have two relevant situations: the "generous" PO can be more profitable than the NE itself, or the other way around. This can be checked by the sign of G A + G B If it is positive, then the payoff of 00 is higher, if it is negative, then it is lower.
• NC payoff is higher than the PC payoff
This situation corresponds to one of the elementary regions conforming the rhomboidal regions: the outer one in the left graphic and the inner one in the right one. An example called "Hershey's kisses game" is mentioned in [Dehejla] . Another is "Deadlock" in [Flitney] . These are then 1 12 of all the games.
• NC payoff is lower than the PC payoff
This situation corresponds to the other 2 elementary regions in the two rhomboids: the inner one in the left graphic and the outer one in the right one. In this class we find the famous "Prissioner's Dilemma" [Morris2] These also are of all the games. If we compare the payoff of the NE with the mixed symmetric position in the middle of the PO positions, we can asign each triangle a different kind of game:
• NE payoff is higher than the mixed diagonal PO payoff
Here G A > G AB . This is shown as the left triangle in the graphic ( 1 24 of all the games)
• NE payoff is lower than the mixed diagonal PO payoff of the sphere. In this class we find the so called assurance game [Sauermann] also called Stag-Hunt Game" [Flitney] . But, again, we can distinguish two cases:
• The PC payoff is higher than the other diagonal payoff of all the games (Upper triangle in the graphic)
• The PC payoff is lower than the other diagonal payoff of all the games. These can be problematic games, because there are two equilibria, both very stable. Half of them, of course, will give higher payoff to one of the equilibria, and half of them to the other. This can give the players a certain predilection. But in the line between the two halves (shown in the figure) there are two equilibria, and we have a real dilemma for the players. In this class we find the "Pareto Coordination" game [GameTheory.net]. of all the games). We find in this class the famous "Chicken game" [Morris2] , [Sauermann] , [GameTheory.net] also called "Hawk-dove game" [Flitney] We can, again, distinguish two posibilities:
• PO payoff is lower than the mixed diagonal NE payoff • PO payoff is higher than the mixed diagonal NE payoff of all the games) These are also games with a nonproblematic solution, because there is a mixed symmetric NE wich is extraordinairely stable.
CONCLUSIONS
The following image presents a map of the different kinds of games according to the Robinson classification, projected on the unfolded cube:
In this map is all the information we need about the relations between classes of games, like these:
• The probability of geting a certain class with a random payoff matrix, is the number of cells occupied by this class, divided by 24 (the total number of cells)
• Distorting a payoff matrix we can change the class of the game. The map shows us in which direction (in the G parameter space) a change from one class to another happens.
• The games with non-strictly-ordered payoff matrices are represented by the lines between classes, and can also be quantified by the length of the line. (one example is the "Friend-or-Foe game", a non-ordered-payoff game lying between the Prisioner's dilemma and the Chicken game [Wikipedia] Even though in the circle there seem to be two kinds of lines, long ones with unit length and short ones with length 1/ √ 2, in the sphere all lines are 60 degrees long.
If we impose a boundary to the differences of payoffs within a matrix, we are restricting the space of parameter to a cube. This makes no difference for the fraction of strictly ordered payoffs games in a class, but for nonstriclty-ordered games the difference mentioned above is important.
